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Faculty and Deans

PRESIDENT CLINTON'S
CAPITAL GAINS PROPOSALS
by John Lee

John Lee is a professor of law at the MarshaUWythe School of Law, College of William & Mary,
Williamsburg, Virginia.
Professor Lee believes that the generic capital
gains rate should not be increased over 28 percent
for revenue and political reasons. But to reflect that,
on the average, capital gains realized by middle-income families consists entirely of inflation gain,
while half of the capital gain realized at the 31percent bracket and above consists of economic
gain, increasing to SO-percent economic at the very
top, he argues that a greater exclusion should be
provided at ·the 28- and IS-percent brackets, either
by a "progressive schedule" or by a $3,500 annual
exclusion. To ' strengthen the political base for increasing the top rates 'and to avoid the risk of the
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COMMENTARY I SPECIAL REPORT
I. FLAT RATE CAPITAL
GAINS PREFERENCE

A. Background
1. Clinton's flat rate preference. President
Clinton's income tax proposals would increase the top
ordinary rates to 36 percent at around $140,000 in taxable family income and, in effect, to more than 41 p ercent at $250,000 in taxable income. At the same time,
the maximum individual across-the-board or generic
capital gains tax rate would remain at 28 percent. This
flat rate capital gains preference of 13 points or so
would provide the practical effect of a 9.6-percent exclusion at the 31-percent bracket (commencing at
$89,150 in taxable family income), a 22-percent exclusion at the 36-percent bracket, and a 31.7-percent
exclusion at the 41 -percent rate. At the 28-percent
and the lower IS-percent brackets, a generic capital
gain would be afforded no preference. Over 70 percent of individual capital gains are realized by individuals at the 31-percent and, especially, at the
highest brackets, where nearly 75 percent of the
families annually realize capital gains with an
average gain of $100,000 or so, according to a 1990
Joint Committee on Taxation aCT) study. At such
higher levels, according to a 1985 CBO study, on the
average, 50 percent of realized capital gains are
economic, i.e., in excess of the rate of inflation while
held, rising to 80 perce nt at the very top. At lower
levels, on the average, none of the usually irregularly
realized capital gains exceed the rate of inflation .
Thus, the effective exclusion under the 28-p e rcent
flat rate capi tal gains preference regreSSively would
increase proportionately with both economic gains
a nd higher income and decrease proportiona tely
with both percentage of inflation ga in and lower income.

The administration's answer to the
charge that the 28-percent flat rate
ceiling is the equivalent of a generic
capital gains cut no doubt would be
that such flat rate is not a 'cut,' but
merely retains the existing capital
gains cap.
2. Congressional criticism. Some tax-writin g
members of Congress, including Senator Bill Bradley,
D-N.J., and Representatives Robert Matsui, D-Cali£..
and Sander Levin, D-Mich., in the February 24 Senate
Finance Committee and March 9 and 10 House Ways
and Means hearings on the president's economic
plan, have criticized a flat maximum 28 -percent
generic capital gains rate. These members questioned
the Secretary of the Treasury, Lloyd Bentsen, and the
Chair of the President's Economic Council, Laura
Tyson, at these hearings as to why (a) generiC capital
gains were not subject to the higher rates, and (b) the
generic capital gains preference was only available
to high-income individuals.
1400

3. Administration's rationales. Candidate Clinton
had opposed a generic capital gains cut on the stump.'
The administration's answer to the charge that the 28percent flat rate ceiling is the equivalent of a generic
capital gains cut no doubt would be that this flat rate
is not a "cut," but merely retains the existing capital
gains cap.
Dr. Tyson's response at the March 9, 1993 House
hearing was that the objectives of the Clinton tax package were "deficit reduction , balance, progressivity, and
incentives for investment - I would say those are OUf
main objectives - and [we will try to be sure that the
package accomplishes them] ... in a way which is as
least distortionary as possible."2 In short, the 28-percent generic capital gains cap res ted o n "balance,"

''' My objection is to an across-the-board capi tal gains cut
on stocks traded on the s tock exchange, which is where
Senator Tsongas concentrates his - an d let me "rgue one, we
tripled the stock market in the 'SOs. That's fine. We can't do
any bette r than that in the '90s. We can't do belief than triple.
But average wages went down, the work week lengthened,
poverty exploded, we los t our competitive edge. So my argument is, this inequality that we go t was accompanied by
declining economic growth. .. And to give these across-theboard cuts to people who've got - look at thi s, th at's who's
going to benefit from the across-the-board capital gains, the
people th at have got 60 percent of the weal th in the last
decade, and it did not make us a richer country." Trall script of
Democratic Candidat es Debate: Gov. Bill Clill tOIl, Sell. I'alll Tsongas,
and fern; Brown, Chicago, Monday, March 16, 1992. "I am opposed to Senator Tsonga::;'s proposal for a capital gains tax
cut. That has no thing to do with the manufact urin g base of
this country any more. Look at Genera l Motors. You give it
capital gains ta x cut, you drive up the value of General Motors
stock, they s till lay the wor kers off here and continue to build
a plant in Ge rm any and one in Mexico. The ca pital gains cu t
no longer is tied to in ves tment in American jobs. And I am
again st the across-the-board cuts for the weal thy that got 60
percent of the wealth for only 1 percent of the peo ple in 19S0.
So let's give incentives to peop le, but only if th ey invest in
our jobs, our peop.le, and our future." Tran script of Presidential
Candida te Gov. Bill Cl inton's News Conference, Chicago, Illinois,
September 21, 1992.
2She was s umming up her prev ious more complete rationale for higher rates but a 2S-percent maximum capital gains
rate. "Dr. Tyson: . _ . [Flirst, it brings u s back full circle back
to the first question of the chairman, which is in it way, when
you try to ... we' re in a situation where we want to use a .. .
we need to use revenues as part of deficit reduction, to get
- first of all, to ge t a credible amoun t o f deficit red uction, it
really requ ires some revenues. Secondly, we want to do thi s
in a balanced way. But once we ge t to that, w e - dnd then
we also have, inciden tally, the goa l of trying to restore some
o f the p rogressivi ty into the tax system, which really was
reduced during the 19S05." Unofficial Transcript of March 9,
1993 Ways & Menns Hearing on Clinton EconoTllic Plnll,
electronically reproduced, 93 Tax Noles Today 59-93.

TAX NOTES, June 7, 1993

COMMENTARY I SPECIAL REPORT

which can be a political as well as economic virtue. 3
Secretary Bentsen addressed the 28-percent ra te query
with two rationales: (1) that 28 percent was the revenue
maximizing rate 4 because above that b l ocking
resulted,s and (2) "to encourage to some degree people
moving into equities to try to help start new ventures
and to try to build new companies."6 As to the second
point of reinvestment of funds from public market
sales in new ventures, Congress bought that argument
before in 1942, despite misgivings as to its accuracy.7
At the present and probably throughout the past, noninstitutional financing of closely held businesses,
whether mom and pop re tail or start-up ventures (more
machine tool than Silicon Valley), can only be obtained

3The economic virtue is economic efficiency if a rate above
28 percent reduces realizations that historically have followed the market more than rates. That is not to say that rates
may not have had an effect on the market; witness the 19205
and 1980s speculative booms. The political virtue of a 28-percent maximum rate is that without it a majority of conservative, mostly southern, Democrats likely would rejoin the Republicans in forming a "conservative coalition" in either
blocking the proposed rate increases or more probably, and
even worse, restoring a much lower generic capital gains
preference, possibly just half of the 28-percent rate. My guess
is that this would more likely occur in the Senate than in the
House.
4Joint Committee Chief of Staff Ron Pearlman had offered
28.6 percent as a possible revenue-maximizing rate in the
1990 Senate hearings on tax incentives, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
65; accord JCS-19-90, p. 41.
5Since already 50 percent of annual appreciation in public
stock held by individuals is not realized prior to the shareholder's death, increas ing the rate on capital gains to 36 or
41 percen t is likely to reduce (a) realizations, at least among
nontraders, and (b) revenues from thi s sector.
60fficial Transcript of Senate's Clinton Economic Proposal
Heari'lg, February 24, 1993, electronically reproduced 93 Tax
Notes Today 48-79. At the March 10, 1993 House Ways and
Means hearing, Secretary Bentsen explained to Rep. Matsui,
D-Calif., that the 13-point differential "was done with intent
and an understanding that it would probably encourage a
shift toward investment. That's the purpose of it, that it will
cause an increased interest in equity investments that would
help start businesses and create jobs. That is fully understood. There's another point that economists argue, that at
some point you get the locked in feature more, and some
would argue that you're near that breaking point at 28 percent. So that is another thing under consideration, that you
lose revenue if you get it too high; assets get locked in . But
there is an absolute and full intent to try to encourage investment."
1Compare H.R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1942)
with 1942 House Hearings on Rroenue Rroision, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. (Vol. 1) 265, (Vol. 2) 163-64 (1942) (colloquy between
Treasury Special Tax Adviser Randolph Paul and Rep . Reed,
R-N.Y.).
TAX NOTES, June 7, 1993

from t he entrepreneur, family, and friends. s The
revenue estimators seem, however, to assume substan t ial movement of funds, probably from the public s tock
sector, to qualified small business corporations via
pooled investment funds. Except for foregone trades
due to funds tied up for five years in small business
corporation holdings, where would they get revenue
losses during the first five years of the provision?
Foregone sales of the small businesses themse lves
during the first five years after creation surely con stitute a small source for such estimated revenue
losses, given the minimal likelihood of sales of such
businesses during the first five years of operation
a n yway.
4. Why reward ch u rning as a way of life? Combining the CBO and JCT studies discussed at l.A.5 and
l.A .6 below, the apparent pattern is that, year after
year, the same high-income individuals, say the top 2
percent, realize the bulk of capital gains reported . Most
of that gain is from public stock, and most is economic.
Also, data from the 1960s and earlier decades shows
that the higher up the income scale, the greater the
percentage of the taxpayers in that class who annually
realize capital gains and the greater percentage of total
income that their capita l gains amount to on the
average . Thus, the populis t charge, during the 1920s
and 1930s and again during the past 10 years, that a
generic capital gains preference mostly rewards churning on the secondary public stock market by high -income individuals for whom such regular gains are a
major if not the principal source of their income, is
basically true.
That being the case, why do I support a 28-percent
cap on generic capital gains? First, I surmise that the
package of "ideal" rules described in V. below is not
now politically obtainable and, worse, that attempts to
enact them could instead trigger enactment by the conservative coalition of less equitable provisions than the
current rules. Second, taxing generic capital gains at
ordinary rates (a) is equally unobtainable politically
while retaining, or even harder, reinstituting, high ordinary rates, as evidenced by President Carter's 1978
failed attempt to repeal capital gains; and (b) based on
the high rates without a capital gains preference experience of 1916-1920, and assuming the 28.S-percent
revenue maximizing capital gains rate estimated by the

SHearings on Economic Growth and the President's Budget
Proposals Before the Senate Firulnce Committee (Part 1), 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 56, 60 (1992) (Statement of Robert Gilbertson,
representing American Electronics Association) (Venture
Economics data indicates 96 percent of equi ty financing in
sma ll s tart-up companies comes from " th e owner /
entrepreneur himself, his relatives, friends, or groups of small
businessmen ... who will take some of their money and put
it into a risk pool together") (the latter pattern is strong in
some immigrant groups); accord id. at 61 (Statement of John J.
Motley, representing National Federation of Independent
Business) (NFIB study reached same conclusion); Hearings on
Impact, Effectiveness, and Fairness of the Tax Reform Act of 1986
before the House Ways and Means Committee, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 118 (1990) (statement of Professor Auerbach); id. at 130
(statement of Henry Aaron) .
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Joint Committee on Taxation Staff,9 would reduce revenues (unless coupled with taxation of unrealized capital appreciation at death, in which case the "conservative coalition" on capital gains 10 would surely demand
and get a generic capital gains cut as a trade-off). The
28-percent cap, coupled with a substantial ordinary
rate increase, is the remaining alternative for restoring
some of the eroded progressivity of the late 1970s and
early 1980s, when effective rates a t the top fell from 36
percent to 22 percent (subsequently to rise back to 28
percent).ll Thirdly, I conclude in 11.0. and E. below that
the PAL changes and a generic 28-percent capital gains
rate would not revive 1976-1986 style tax shelters (but
I would recommend total real estate depreciation
recapture, at least for taxpayers not subject to PAL due
to the proposed real estate business exception). And
under the implicit "rule of 28," discussed at II.E. below,
the old progressivity Ihorizontal equi ty effective rate
disparities at the top individual brackets should not
reappear.

B. Analysis
This section assumes that the top permanent rate on
individual capital gains will not be above 28 percent
in the final legislation for revenue and political reasons. It focuses, therefore, on the question of whether
some deduction or exclusion should be provided for
capital gains of taxpayers below the top rates, or perhaps at the top rate. This question is addressed first
from an equity perspective focusing on (a) the inverse
relationship between income level of individual taxpayers reporting capital gains and inflation component
of realized capital gains, and (b) the direct relationship
between income level and the percentage of capital
gains regularly reported. The article then sketches the
historical experience of flat rate capital gains in the
Revenue Act of 1921 and the botched remedies over the
following decades that resulted in great vertical and
horizontal inequities from around 1976 to 1986, which
were exacerbated by the tax shelter boom . In conclusion, this section advocates, much like the 1992
Senate and Conference versions of H.R. 4210, an individual schedule of "progressive" rates on capital
gain, ranging from a zero rate at the IS-percent ordinary income bracket to 28 percent at the 36-percent
bracket on policy (rough mimicking of percentage of
gain equal to rate of inflation while held) and distribu tional or fairness grounds. A simpler alternative with

9Hearings on Tax Incentives for In creasing Savings alld Invest ments before the Senate Finance Committee, lOIst Cong., 2d Sess.

65 (1990) (Statement of Ronald Pearlman, Chief of Staff, Joint
Committee on Taxation.)
l~he votes on capital gains in the House in 1989 reveal a
pattern of all but one or two House Republicans plus a
majority of conservative, mostly Southern, Democrats (less
than 25 percent of all Democrats) voting one way while the
remaining House Democrats voted the other way. Such a
voting pattern gives rise to the conservative coalition so
defined by the Congressional Quarterly.
IIHouse Ways and Means Majority Staff, Tax Progressivity
and Income Distribution, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (Comm. Print
1990).
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much the same effect would be an xclusion of the first
$3,500 in annual capital gains, perhaps phased out
across th e 31-percent bracket much like the proposals
by Senator Gaylord Nelson, D-Wis., in the 1970s, the
Bush administration in 1989, and House Ways and
Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski, D-Ill., in 1990.
1. Inflation element. Perversely, the proposed flat
28-percent maximum individual capital gains rate constitutes the mirror image of the percentage of realized
capital gains equal to the rate of inflation while held,
by income classes. In all published government studies
the percentage of economic income, if any, increases
with income level and, conversely, the percentage of
gain equa l to the rate of inflation increases with
decreasing income levels. Thus in 1980, according to a
1985 CBO study, Indexing Capital Gains, individual taxpayers with adjusted gross income above $100,000 enjoyed, on the average, a 50-percent "real" or economic
gain as to capital gains reported that year. As the income level rose above $100,000, the percentage of
economic gain on the average rose as well, reaching 82
percent at the $1 million AGI level (and accounting for
18 percent of realized gains that year). Below the
$100,000 AGI level, on the average, all reported capital
gains as a percentage of basis were less than the rate
of inflation while held, i.e., all "inflationary" gain.
These extremes may have been skewed in 1980 with a
beginning s tock market boom following a period of
stagflation, but the same general pattern is consistent
across the recent decades. Former JCT Chief of Staff
Ron Pearlman once told me that this pattern reflects
that many high-income individuals sell public stock
after relatively short holding periods and dispose of
improved rea l estate, which until the late 1980s bust
did better than the rate of inflation. Conv ersely, middle-income individuals realizing capital gains tend to
have longer holding periods and hence fail to keep up
with inflation.
2. Recurring capital gains. The Joint Committee,
through " timed series" studies of capital gains realizations by a sample of the CBO study'S taxpayers from
1978-83, demonstrated that the sa me high-i ncom e individuals with multiple transactions year after year
accounted for 80 percent of the tax benefits of a generic
capital gains preference with an average capital gain
of about $100,000. 12 Conversely, while taxpayers realizing capital gain in only one of the five years sampled
amounted to over 60 percent of the taxpayers in the
five-year sample, their gains in the aggregate

12Almost 60 percent of the capital gains rea lized in the
sa mple went to the 15.7 percent of the individuals who
reported capital gains in all five years surveyed, with an
average gain of $100,000; over 70 percent went to those with
gains in four out of th e fiv e years. Joint Committee Staff,
Explanation of Methodology Used to Estimate Proposals Affecting

tile Taxation of Income from Capital Gains 48-9 OCS-19-90}; Hearings on Tax Incelltives for Increasing Savillgs and In vestmellts
Before the Senate Finance Committee, 101 st Cong., 2d Sess. 70
(1990); Hearings on Impact, Ef!ectivene:;s, and Fainress of tlte Tax
Reform Act of 1986 before tlte H(ll/se Ways and Means Committee,

101st Cong., 1st Sess. 216-17, 248-49,273 (1990) . This study
(Footnote continued on next page.)
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amounted to only 10 percent of the capital gains
reported with an average capital gain of $2,000,13 or
about $3,500 in today's dollars.
3. Flat rate capital gains before. In 1921, Congress
enacted a flat 121h-percent individual capital gains rate
for gains from capital assets held two years or longer.
Congressional tax writers were familiar with the 60percent drop-off in revenues at the highest brackets
despite a general boom during the period 1916-18,
when capital gains were subject to full ordinary rates
rising to above 70 percent.14 Accordingly, they enacted
the flat rate to unlock blocked transactions and thus
increase revenues. IS With this move, progressivity became a farce, as was the entire income tax. 16 For example, in the boom year 1925, only 70,000 out of 2.5
million taxpaying individuals were at brackets higher
than 121!.z percent (those earning more than $30,000,
today's $210,000), and the less than 10,000 earning
$100,000 or more garnered almost 90 percent of the
benefits from the flat capital gains rateY These same
individuals paid almost 50 percent of the income
taxes. IS
In 1934, Congress's first attempt to reform the capital
gains preference attempted too much: a capital gains
deduction for middle-income taxpayers, an "unblocking" rate for high-income taxpayers with most of the
capital gains, and a rough offset for inflation (which
would not return until after World War II) . The result
was a "confusing" sliding scale deduction format
reaching a maximum 70-percent deduction (with maximum rate of 20.1 percent at the top bracket) at 10 years.
In fact, as Treasury had warned, this sliding scale or

(Footnote 12 continued.)
was requested by then Rep. (now Senator) Byron Dorgan,
D-N.D. The high-income taxpayers' share of the tax benefit
of the capital gains preference is even greater than their share
of realized capital gains, due to the added gear of a higher
ordinary rate avoided by the capital gain. And their share of
economic gain is highest of all.
13Methodology, supra note 12 at 48-9.
14See 61 Congo Rec. (Part 5) 5289 (House August 19, 1921)
(Remarks of Rep. Green, R-Iowa, House Ways and Means
member); Confidential Hearings on H.R . 8245 before the Senate
Finance Committee, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 36-7, 306-07 (1921)
(statement of Senator Reed Smoot, R-Utah).
15H.R. Rep. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921).
15Due to generous personal and family exemptions, only
2~ million taxpayers (out of 30 to 40 million workers) were
subject to the income tax while more federal revenues were
raised from regressive excise taxes, as the taxwriting committees knew in the 1930s. Hearings on the Revenue Act of 1932
before tile Senate Finance Committee, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1932) (Statement of Sec'ty of Treasury Ogden Mills). This
same pattern actually intensified under President Franklin
Roosevelt. See Leff, The Limits of Symbolic Reform (Cambridge
University Press 1984).
17Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, Supplemental Report on Capital Gains and Losses Vol. 1, Pt. 7, p. 5-5
(1929); Report of a Subcommittee of the Committee on Ways alld
Means, Proposed Revision of the Revenue lAws, 1938, 75th Cong.,
3d Sess. 90 (1938).
18Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1938, before tile Hou se Committee on Ways and Means , 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 116-21 (1938).
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"step rate" resulted in blocking, as high-income taxpayers clustered at the 10-year mark, while middle-income taxpayers with capital gains clustered at the first
steps with smaller deductions and hence higher rates.19
This blocking charge carried the day as the Depression
"double-dipped" in 1938 following the lesser known
stock market crash of 1937, resulting in shorter holding
periods for the lowest rates and in the final compromise in 1942 of a 50-percent long-term (six-month
holding period) capital gains deduction for the individual with a small income and an alternative [25percent flat] capital gains rate for the high-income taxpayer. 20 By this time, 70 million taxpayers were covered
by the income tax and the top ordinary rates were
climbing back up to soon reach 90 percent. This alternative flat rate continued unchanged until the Tax
Reform Act of 1969, which partially limited it with a
$50,000-per-year ceiling (probably then the average
realized capital gain at the top). After repeated failed
attempts by tax liberals to repeal this remaining flat
rate preference for the rich, Congress eliminated it in
1978 as a weak tradeoff, along with lengthening the
holding period from the 1942-established six months
to one year, for enacting at the same time the conservative coalition's increase in the basic exclusion from
the 50-percent established by the 1942 Act to a 60-percent deduction. President Carter had campaigned on
repeal of the capital gains preference, arousing the special interests, which then united to force Carter to back
down on repeaL although the president still called for
tightening up the capital gains rules for high-income
individuals. Once the capital gains lobby geared up to
fight the repeal prevailed, it shifted to the offensive
and sought a greater preference (double-dipping indexing in the House) .21
The result of high nominal rates, coupled with a
substantial capital gains preference, was a pattern from
at least the 1950s through the mid 1980s of two-thirds
to three-fourths of high-income taxpayers achieving an
effective income tax rate far below the maximum
nominal rate, while the remaining high-income individuals were taxed at effective rates closer to the
nominal progreSSive rates. For example, in the 19605
and 1970s, the general pattern was that the average
effective rate for high-income individuals was 35 percent. Those taxpayers with heavy capital gains (higher
average income) had an effective rate of 22 percent,
while the others had an effective rate in the high 40s

19H.R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1942); Statement of Acting Secretary of the Treasury regarding the Preliminary
Report of a Subcommittee of the Committee on Ways and Mean s 6
(1933).
20The explicit aiming of the 50-percent deduction at the
taxpayer with small capital gains and the flat rate at the
taxpayer with a large capital gains income is revealed in the
legislative history to the two-step capital gains provision
adopted in the Revenue Act of 1938. Confidential Senate Hearings 011 H.R. 9682 (Revenue Act of 1938) before the Senate Finance
Committee (Part 1), 75th Cong., 3d Sess. II , 15-16 (1938) (slatement of Dr. Roswell Magill, Under Secretary of Treasury).
21"Tax Cut for Capital Gains Stalled," 7 Tax Notes 702 Oune
19, 1978}.
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and even 50s, when the maximum rate ranged from the
70s all the w ay to the 90s.22
As Stanley Surrey pointed out in the 1950s tax policy
hearings led by House Ways and Means Chairman Wilbur Mills, D-Ark., the extreme disparity between top
ordinary rates and the alternative 25-percent capital
gains rates after the Revenue Act of 1942 first led seemingly inexorably to Congress incrementally bestowing
capital gains on add itional s pecial interests, starting
with timber and then coal and iron royalties, livestock,
improved real estate, patents, etc., in the 1940s and
1950s.23 The political basis for such legislation was the
conservative coalition on capital gains, which also
defeated or watered down direct and indirect capital
gains reforms in the 1960s and 1970s. 24 This coalition
consisted of almost all the Republicans and a majority
of Southern Democrats, who squared off against the
rest of the Democrats. Simplified, perhaps to the point
of caricature, the Southern Democrats, particularly in
the House, s upported a generic preference to take care
of timber, lives tock, and small business, while Republicans supported it to take care of public stock held
by high-in come individuals and perhaps some of the
Democratic-favored interest groups as well, particularly
timber, in the case of southern Republicans.
4. Suggested capital gains preference for the small
income. Given that, on the average, capital gains realized by taxpayers below the 31-percent bracket are less
than the rate of inflation for the period the capital asset
was held, and that, on the average, perhaps 50 percent
of the gain realized by taxpayers above the 28-percent
rate exceeds the rate of inflation (rising to 80 percent
at the top brackets), a flat 28-percent rate providing no
capital gains preference a t all to those taxed below that
rate is inequitable, just as the Democrats acknowledged
in 1934.25 A flat exclusion, say 30 percent, still benefi ts
high-income individuals with 60 percent to 70 percent

22110 Congo Rec. (Part 2) 1438 (Senate Jan . 30, 1964)
(Remarks of floor manager Senator Russell Long, D-La.).
23Joint Committee on Economic Report, Federal Tax PoIiCl)
for Economic Growth and Stability: Papers SlIbmitted by Panelists
Appearing before the Subcommittee on Tax Policy, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess. 104 (Comm. Print 1956).
24President John F. Kennedy and Stanley Surrey unsuccessfully attempted in 1963 to couple an increase in the capital gains excl usion from 50 percent to 70 percent with
elimination of the 1940s/50s statutory capital gains add-ons
and taxation of unrealized capital appreCiation at death . Next
the 1969 minimum tax on individual tax preferences, although mostly directed at capital gains (80 percent of the
preferences consisted of the then-50-percent long-term capi·
tal gains exclusion), was never very effective as long as capital gains were subject to it due to low rates and offsets. The
role of the conservative coalition in capital gains legislation
and the interest groups represented became evident in the
1970s, with numerous separate votes and debates on capital
gains, the impact of the mini-tax's (antecedent to the AMT)
on capital gains, and the tax treatment of unrealized capital
appreciation at death.
25Confidential Hearings on H.R. 7385 (Revenlle Act of 1934)
Before the Senate Finance Commillee (Part 1), 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 107 (1934) (Colloquy between Senator Reed, R-Pa ., ranking minority member, and Roswell Magill).
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of the gains inequitably, because lower-rate taxpayers
who realize a capital gain (a) by virtue of such rate
receive a lesser benefit, and (b) on the average, are
taxed totally on inflation gain with no economic gain
while higher income taxpayers, on the average, enjoy
a 50-percent economic gain (rising to 80 percent at the
very top, some years).
On the average, in contrast, a "progressive" formula,
as the Senate and House passed in 1992 but President
Bush vetoed, providing an increasing capital gains rate
from zero percent to 28 percent move from the lowest
to the highest individual bracket works rough justice
at the top and bottom, but less so in the middle. I
therefore recommend that Congress pass it again .
Rather than the 14-percent and 21-percent rates 26 at the
28-percent and 31-percent brackets, however, I would
use the average percentage of inflation gain at these
levels as the excl usion percentage. This percentage
probably would be 50 percent at the 31-percent bracket
and considerably higher at the 28-percent bracket. A
progressive formula is preferable to indexing, apart
from the distributional effects and out year costs of indexing,27 because indexing probably would lead to
high-income individuals making considerably fewer
trad es (as they held on to an investment with an economic gain waiting for inflation to catch up), thus at
least reducing revenue and possibly a decrease in economic efficiency.
A substantial disadvantage of the progressive rate
is its cost - perhaps $8 billion over a five-year window.

26Equiva lent to a 50-percent and roughly 30-percent exclusion.
27Dis tributi onally, the Senate Finance Committee's
progressive cap ital gains cut would have moved the tax
benefits away from the top quite effectively. For example, in
1992, only 34.2 percent of its projected benefits would have
gone to individuals earning over $100,000, with 25.6 percent
going to the $100,000 to $200,000 range. Joint Committee on
Taxation, Preliminary Distributional Effect of Provisions affectillg
High-Income Taxpayers (#D92-5 060 March 2, 1992), electronically reproduced 92 Tax Notes Today 49-14. Contrast the distributional effect of the House's 1992 indexing proposal (50
to 60 percent to top). Senate Finance Committee Chairman
Bentsen justified his progressive cap ital gains proviSion on
its distributional impact, the mirror image of th e
administration's. 138 CongoRec. 53088 (Senate March 10,1992
Daily Ed.) (Remarks of Chairman Bentsen , D-Te x.)
("[administration's) proposal would have given 66 pt!rcent
of the benefits to people with incomes over $200,000 - 66
percent to less than 1 percent of the people. Our proposal
gives 66 percent to those making under $100,000."); accord,
id. at 3087 (same); 138 Congo Rec. S 3265-66 (Senate March 11,
1992 Daily Ed.) (Remarks of Chairman Bentsen). Moreover,
Chairman Bentsen contin ued, the committee's top rate of 36
percent was close to the top individual rate of 35 percent
sought by President Reagan in 1985. ld. at S3266 (Senate
March 11, 1992 Daily Ed.) (Chairman Bentsen). Senator Bob
Packwood, R-Ore., Senate Finance Committee member,
rejOined with a lecture on the difference between nominal
rates and effec tive rates. ld . at 53266. The stronger argument
wou ld have been that 35 percent had been the effective rate
of the high-income taxpayers in the 1960s and 19705. Set'
(Footnote continued on next page.)
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Also, it still provides about one-third of its benefits to
individuals a t or above the 31-percent bracket, but less
than 10 percent to higher brackets. Since the progressive capital gains rate would be so generous at the
lower income tax brackets, J would make it elective and
carry a toll charge - give up the inflation element of
any investment interest incurred while holding the
asset or of mortgage interest if gain on a residence were
subject to the progressive rate.
Anticipating that Congress will not be too interested
in a progressive schedule due to its cost and failure to
provide benefits to interest groups sponsored by the
Democratic elements of the conservative coalition on
capital gains, except for the small woodlot owner and
farmer with recurring livestock sales, I would suggest,
alternatively, simply excluding the first $3,500 or so of
annual capital gain. Similar approaches were proposed
by Senator Gaylord Nelson, O-Wis., in the 1970s, the
Bush administration in 1989, and Rep. Rostenkowski
in 1990 in his middle-income capital gains package.
This amount probably does not exceed the average
capital gain of the small capital gains realizer.28 Such
gain is likely to be all inflation gain and be nonrecurring at the bottom income tax brackets. This ceiling
probably would cover 60 percent of the individuals
reporting capital gains, but less than 20 percent of the
annual realized gains. This flat exclusion could be
phased out across the 31-percent bracket at the cost of
simplicity, but would improve distributional aspects
even more.
II. SHELTERS, PROGRESSIVITY, COMPLEXITY

A. Congressional Concerns
In the March 17, 1993 continuing House Ways and
Means hearing on President Clinton's economic plan,
ABA Section of Taxation Chairman Albert O'Neill tes-

(Footnote 27 continued.)
Nasar, "Who Paid the Most Taxes in the 80s? The Superrich,"
New York Times, Section 3, page 4, col. 1, at col. 2 (Sunday
May 31, 1992) ("They paid an average of just 27 percent of
their incomes to the Internal Revenue in 1989. In 1977, the
earliest year for which Congressional Budget Office data are
available, they paid a much heavier 36 percent.") . Moreover,
due to depreciation recapture being taxed at 31 percent, twice
as many taxpayers earning $200,000 and above would have
an increase in income taxes as would have a decrease, and
the aggregate increase would be about 150 perce nt of the
aggregate decrease. See Preliminary Distributional Effect, supra.
The outyear costs of indexing are reportedly enormous. 138
Congo Rec. H607 (House Feb. 26, 1992 Daily Ed.) (Remarks of
Rep. David Obey, D-Wis.) ("[AJfter five years the long· term
costs of that capital gains gift, half of which goes to the super
wealthy, will total $300 billion."); id. at H 615 (House Feb . 26,
1992 Daily Ed.) (Remarks of Rep. Anthony Beilenson, D-Cal.)
(likely cost about $300 billion over next 20 years).
28 1 adjusted the 1980 average gain of $2,000 to 1990 dollars.
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tified that "[t]he American Bar Association has strongly
supported the fundamental objectives of the 1986 act,
and we continue to believe in the benefits to our tax
system that flow from the Simplicity, efficiency and
fairness created by a broad base with lower rates." He
raised the specter of transactional complexity.29 House
Ways and Means Chairman Rostenkowski displayed
his true concern 30 by asking O'Neill a different follow -

29"The proposed increase in ordinary income rates will
create over 12-percent disparity in rates between capita l gains
and ordinary income at the top end. We believe that this
spread will be sufficient to cause high-income taxpayers to
spend considerable time once again planning their transactions so as to convert ordinary income into capital gains. The
targeted capital gains proposals will obviously exacerbate the
situation even more."
3O"Chairman Rostenkowski: . .. I just remember the '86
Act, when we got rid of a lot of these so-called incentives,
and I'm not totally against it but I worry about whether or
not we're starting on the road of another - the possibili ty
of us having another fun on tax incentives that many of us
consider loopholes unnecessary." March 10, 1993 House
Hearings, supra (speaking of proposed temporary investment
credit).
The administration shared some of this concern with tax
shelters:
Secretary Bentsen: The package includes both tax incentives and public investment expenditures. The tax side of the
investment package includes two important provisions for
small business, since sma ll businesses are a major source of
new jobs.
First, small business will continue to enjoy the permanent
investment tax credit that's introduced in the stimulus package, and second, we propose that inves tors in s mall corporations be able to exclude 50 percent of the gain in stocks held
more than five years.
This exclusion is carefully targeted to small growth companies and to avoid abuse. Those were cited by the chairman
a moment ago. The one concern is we're not trying to build
up a bunch of tax loopholes or shelters in the process.
ld. March 10,1993. The conservatives opposed the incentives-cum-rate increases as well:
Mr. Crane: Well, the Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away.
What happens is you have a tax increase which s ucks out
money from the system, reduces savings, reduces spending,
therefore, reduces unemploymen t; and therefore, you have
military reductions, which in turn reduce the employment in
the military, which again increases unemployment. Then on
the other hand, to offset that, you have tax incentives for a
variety of different businesses, particularly the high-tech
businesses on the west coast, and also you have spending
programs.
Why don't you just leave it alone so that you don't offset
one problem with another, which is originally created when
you increase the taxes and reduce the military?
Id. March 9, 1993.
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up question: what is the effect of the 13-point spread
on tax shelter activities?31 The response was: not that
much, given the continued barrier of the passive activity loss limitations (PAL) of section 469.32 Presidentelect Gordon of the New York State Society of CPAs
observed at the same hearing that the bitter aftertaste
of the 1980s shelter binge has eliminated much of the
demand from passive investors for classic s helters. All
of this calls for, however, steadfastness on the part of
the administration and the tax- writing committee
chairs in retaining (a) the narrowness of the new PAL
exceptions for real estate people, (b) the limitations on
the small-business corporation capital gains preference
(particularly subject to one-half of the 50-percent exclusion to the AMT), and (c) increasing individual AMT
progressive rates to 26 percent and 28 percent. While
some witnesses and Ways and Means members hauled
out the hoary chestnut that high rates would cause a
run on tax-exempts,33 there is a perhaps more real
potential for abuse of income conversion through

31"Chai rman Rostenkowski . ... You' re all awa re, of course,
that the president vetoed what was incorporated as a tax
simplification measure. Are any of you opposed to anything
in the tax simplification measure that was introduced and that
the president vetoed on the last two occasions? I gathered
from most of your testimony that you're interested in tax
simplification.
"Mr. O'Neill, you point out in your testimony that the Tax
Reform Act of '86 attempted to reduce economic distortions
and to eliminate tax sheltering opportunities. As you also
recognize, the administration's plan raises individual tax
rates but leaves the maximum rate on capital gain at 28
percent, thus creating a significant differential.
"What effect do you really think this will have on tax
shelter activities?"
March 17, 1993 House Ways & Means Hearin gs.
32"Well, in the traditional sense of tax shelters, with the
other limitations that have already been imposed, including
the passive loss limitations, I'm not sure in and of themselves
that there will be that much of an impact on what I will call
the traditional tax shelters. I think it's very clear that with a
spread that we are looking at, that there will be a clear intent
and for many taxpayers, complexity will be reintroduced
about dealing with transactions, because people will want
and will plan their affairs and try to come within the lower
capital gains rates. So to the extent you consider a capital
gains rate as a shelter, yes, obviously it will have an impact
there." See also Emory, "Cli nton Tax Plan Will Not Lead to
Tax Shelter Mania," 59 Tax Noles 431 (April 19, 1993).
33Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon raised this argument
in favor of a flat 12Yl-percent individual capital gains rate in
1921, even though he knew that wasn't all of the story for
the fall -off in realizations at the top over the previous five
years.
1406

growth corporations, as evidenced by recent anecdotal
evidence and hard evidence from the 1960s. 34
Also during the March 31, 1993 House Ways and
Means hearing on Clinton's economic plan, witnesses
representing various sma ll business interests generally
spoke in favor of uniform tax increases to be used
solely for deficit reduction 35 and generally in opposition to restoration of preferences and high rates 36 and,
in particular, nickel-and-dime increases on specific industries Y But clearly, their most politically powerful
argument was that imposition of high individual rates
on income of passthrough entities, s uch as subchap ter
S corporations and partnerships, otherwise retained for
expansion, would cost jobs,38 and the resulting disequilibrium between top C corporation inside rates and top
individual rates imposed on passthroughs would
recreate transactional complexity in the choice of tax
entity for small businesses as well as in financing .39 A
workable compromise, for pass through entities a t

34Rep. Robert Matsui, D-Calif., pointed out that the substantial capital gains rate differential will have other consequences,
"for example ... an effect on the issue of accumulated earnings,
because it might be better for publiC corporations not to issue .
. . [dividends) but instead keep the earnings so that it will inflate
the value of stocks, so one would get capital gains treatment. .
. . I received a call just the other day from an investment banker
- an investment counselor from California, who indicated to
me that he may ... (s tart adv ising clients to) shift assets from
taxable bonds to nontaxable bonds and also high risk, high
growth stocks .... " March 9,1993 House Ways and Means Hearing. See also March 31 House Ways and Means Hearing testimony of George Sydnor (High-yield tax-free fund); colloquy
between Harry Sullivan and Rep . Nancy Johnson, R-Conn.
Surrey's studies indicated that high-income individuals held on
the average much lower than average dividend paying stocks.
This fits also with the pattern of many high-income individuals
churning on the public market.
35March 31 House Ways and Means hearing testimony of
Darryl Hartley-Leonard.
36March 31 House Ways and Means heari ng testimony of
George Sydnor and Harry Sullivan.
37March 31 House Ways and Means hearing testimony of
Darryl Hartley-Leona rd and colloquy with Re p. Charles Rangel, D-N.Y. Witnesses George Sy dnor and Harry Sulli van
refused to make the choice when questioned by Rep . Mi chael
Kopets ki, D-Ore., opposing any tax increases.
38March 31 House Ways and Means hearing testimony of
George Sydnor (1.4 million S corporations); Harry Sullivan
(sketches 1980s to present equilibrium between corporate
and individual top income tax rates); Rep. Mel Hancock,
R-Mo. (adopting [without attribution) Mark Mann 's 34-percent cap on retained in expansion S corporation earnings
with 5.6-percent spread imposed a t distribution); March 31
House Ways and Means heari ng testimo ny of Mark Mann.
See also March 25 Senate Finance Committee hearing testimony of Michael Bos kin, Ph .D.
39March 31 House Way s and Means hea ring s tatements of
Rep . Hancock in colloquy with George Sydnor and especially
in colloquy with Mark Mann ("[WJouldn't the incentive be
to take all of the money out [of a passthrough entity) ... even
to the extent of borrowing money within the company [with
deductible interest] to get his earnings out of there and invest
that money in tax-frees and other potential capital gains like
the stock market. .. .?").
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least, derived from the Mann-Hancock proposal is discussed at Ill.D. below.
B. 1950s-1980s Vertical and H o rizo n tal Disparities
From the 19505 through the 19605, according to Stanley
Surrey, then-assistant secretary of Treasury for tax
policy, the principal means by which high-income taxpayers achieved effective rates much lower than the
nominal top rates was th rough the 50-percent capital
gains exclusion, or more precisely, the maximum 25percent alternate rate, followed by interest. 4o The same
pattern held through the early 1970s. By 1983, however,
the mix of sheltering deductions had changed, at least
for high-income individuals with the lowest effective
rates. In 1983, 11 percent of 260,000 high-income taxpayers ($250,000 or more in total positive income (TPI»
achieved effective rates of less than 5 percent of TPI
(after 15 years of Congress attempting to curb shelters
and assure that high-income individuals paid some
minimum tax) .41 High-income taxpayers with below
5-percent effective rates used the capital gains exclu sion and capital losses to offset only 46 percent of TPI.
In contrast, they offset 67 percent of TPI with "business
losses," and one-third of those losses were passed
through from partnerships principally attributable to
improved real estate. 42 Sixty-four percent of these highincome taxpayers used tax shelters. 43 This shift was
due in part to the backdoor consumption tax ACRS
deduction for real estate depreciation, deregulation of
lending institutions funding acquisition of real estate
and overbuilding driven by speculation, and probably

40Hearings on the Subject of Tax Reform (Tax Reform , 1969)
before the House Ways and Means Committee (Part 4), 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 1592, 1598-9 (1969) (statement of Assistant Secretary
Surrey); United States Treasury Department, Tax Reform Stl/dies
and Proposals (Parts 1 and 2), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 84-6 and
142-5, respectively (Comm. Print 1969).
41By 1983, the effective rate of high-income individuals as
a whole was down to 22 percent or so, which was the level
only the taxpayers with $1 million income and large capital
gains had achieved 20 years earlier when high-income individuals as a class had a 35-percent effective rate. Shelters,
lowering the capital gains rate to 20 percent, and the top
ordinary rate to 50 percent, thus dropped the effective rate
at the top from 35 to 22 percent or so.
42Hearing 011 High-Income Taxpayers and Related Partllership
Tax Issues Before the HOl/se Ways and Means Subcommittee on
Oversigllt, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-13 (1985) (Statement of
Ronald Pearlman, Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Tax
Policy. "In 1983,51 percellt of all losses and only 14 percent
of gains ... came from limi ted partnerships .... [T)hree
categories of deductions, namely, interest, depreciation, and
mineral exploration expenses, accounted for over 40 percent
of all deductions - . . . which include wages and salaries,
rents, and taxes .. .. For the sheer magnitude of losses, real
estate operators and lessors of buildings dominate all other
industries. Although their gross income is about one-third of
the total for all partnerships, they account for one-half of the
depreciation deductions and 55 percent of the interest expense." rd. Chicago Law Professor Shaviro makes the interesting and plausible point that the late 1970s heating up of
shelters may have been encouraged by the widespread
publicity in 1969 and then in 1976 about tax shelters.
431d. at 7.
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p u blicity about tax shelters as Congress enacted a
series of ineffectual restrictions on tax shelters. I
suspect that higher effective rate high -income individuals, say 5-percent to 20-percent effective rate,
u sed the capital gains preference more and tax shelter
preferences less.
During the 1980s boom, the greatest increase in
source of income among high-income individuals overall was capital gains - a 171-percent increase in capital
gains 44 (largely a consequence of the boom stock
market trebling and leveraged buyouts, but also the
real estate boom), but only a 100-percent increase in
before-tax income overa l1. 45 Couple that increase with
a cut in their effective rate from 35 percent on the
average to the mid to high 20s on the average, while
the average income at the lower brackets stagnated or
declined even though average hours worked increased
and effective rates, taking into account payroll taxes,
stayed the same or increased, and you have the major
justification in the Clinton campaign for restoration of
some progressivity in the code .4b
C. 1986 Code: Low Rates and Broad Base
Tax shelters were classically defined in 1975 by the
JCT as consisting of (a) deferral of income through

44136 Cong o Rec. 8321 (House Sept. 28, 1990 Daily Ed .)
(remarks of Rep. Tom Downey, D-N.Y.).
45House Ways and Means Majority Staff, Tax Progressivity
and Il1com e Distribution, 101st Cong., 1s t Sess. 2-4, 12-13
(House Ways and Means Comm. Print 1990); Joint Committee
on Taxation Staff, Tax Policy and the Macroeconomy: Stabilization, Growth and Distribution, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 29·30,
55 (House Ways & Means Comm. Print 199]). See generally
M. Kaus, The Elld of Equality 29-32 (Basic Books 1992).
46"The economic philosophy of this administration is that
you make the economy grow by putting more and more
wealth into the hands of fewer and fewer people at the top,
getting government out of the way, and trusting them to
make the right decisions to invest and to create jobs. I believe
the way to make our economy grow is to invest in our people
- our children's education, our workers' skills, our families'
health care - (applause) - our plant and equipment, our
best ideas in research and development. They believe that
you make an economy grow by putting money first ; I believ e
you make an economy grow in a global economy by putting
people first . (Cheers, applause.) You can chart the differences
between us by seeing who has won and who has lost, who
has been helped and who has gotten hurt while this crowd
has run our government over the last twelve years. For 12
years they have rewarded people who cut deals and cut
corners, who make money by pushing paper instead of those
who make money by investing in new plants, new equipment, new businesses - those who work hard, play by the
rules, and pay their taxes. And for the first time since the
Roaring '20s, the top 1 percent of the American people now
control more wealth than the bottom 90 percen t. But while
the rich have been winners, no American would have
begrudged them that since we all want in this free enterprise
system to at least believe our children might grow up to be
rich. No one would have begrudged that if the rest of us had
been helped. But in 1980 we had the highest wages in the
world. Now we're 13th. The census document itself shows
that most Americans are working longer work weeks for
lower wages, paying higher taxes on lower income, paying
(Footnote continued on next page.)
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accelerated deductions based on total cost, (b) leverage
or deduction of interest paid in fi nancing the business,
and (c) conversion or realization of gain attributable to
such ordinary deductions at capital gains ratesY Early
attempts to curb tax shelters, such as section 1250
recapture of "excess" depreciation as to real estate improvements enacted in 1964, the minitax antecedent to
the individual AMT enacted as part of the Tax Reform
Act of 1969, the "at risk" provisions enacted in the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, and the House-passed limitation
on artificial accounting losses in 1975, focused on the
source of the preferential deductions or the type of
financing . They were largely ineffective (as witnessed
by the drop in the effective rate at the top from the
mid-1970s to the early 1980s) mostly because improved
real estate always received at most a slight slap on the
wrist. The 1986 code focused instead on stopping an
individual who does not "materially participate" in an
active business, including by definition rental real estate, from offsetting the business's losses, regardless of
source, against the individual's compensation or
portfolio income. 48 The means chosen to halt this tax
sheltering was the PAL limitations, not the elimination
of the capital gains preference. Front-end leverage and
deferral elements from accelerated preferences were
more important to classic ta x shelters than back-end
capital gains. 49
Conventional wisdom claims that the 1986 code
created a compact of low rates paid for by a broader
base, i.e., less preferences.so Businesses that had gotten
used to the level playing fieid sl complained in 1993 of

(Footno te 46 continued.)

a bigger percentage of their income for housing and for
health care, and yes, for education. Today the United States
Commerce Department issued its report on adjusted figures
for 1991 in which it says that in 1991 there was a 2 percent
real drop in the incomes of the American people, the first
drop since 1982, the worst drop in over 30 years. I will say
that again. Inflation was 4.4 percent, incomes went up 2.2
percent, there was a 2 percent decline in the workings - in
the earnings of the American people even though they
worked more hours than the year before or the decade before.
And the average family is actually spending more hours on
the job than they were 20 years ago."
Remarks by Governor Bill Clinton re: Education and
Economics at Montgomery College, Rockville, Md . Sept. 2,
1992.
47Joint Comm. Staff, Overview of Tax Shelters 1 (1975).
48Cf. Joint Comm. Staff, Federal Income Tax Treatment of
Pass-through Entities 15 (Hearing Pamphlet 1986).
49Cooper, "The Taming of the Shrewd: Identifying and
Controlling Income Tax Avoidance," 85 Collim. L. Rev. 657
(1985).
50March 31 House Ways and Means Hearing testimony of
George Sydnor and Harry Sullivan.
sl" Level playing field" was the sim ile used by Treasury
for economic efficiency in the development of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986.
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reintroduction of high rates and preferences,52 the Clinton formula for "growing the economy."S) Witnesses at
the March 31, ]993 House Ways and Means hearings
espoused the view that the glue to the 1986 act was
that everybody bore some pain. In fact, it was less that
everybody bore equal pain, particularly on the individual side, and more that the drastically lowered
top rate (50 percent to 28 percent/33 percent) required
offsetting high-income individual-specific pain, in the
form of repeal of any capital gains preference greater
than 28 percent and of deductions for consumer interest, and enactment of the PAL limitation on tax-shelter
deductions and the "bubble" 33-percent rate on the
near rich for distributional equity.54
As House Ways and Means Committee member
Charles Rangel, D-N.Y., pointed out in the March 31
House Ways and Means h earings, the 1986 code froze
in place the late-1970s to early-1980s erosion of
progressivity. Senate Finance Committee member Bill
Bradley, D-N.J., admitted this earlier and would agree

S2March 31 House Ways and Means Hearing testimony of
George Sydnor ("Before 1986, the tax system had grown grossly unfair. The numerous preferences which complicated the
code created very wide disparities in the effective tax rates
paid by various industries. NAW considers the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 to be the most important piece of tax legislation
passed in the 47-year history of O Uf organiza tion, because
market forces, rather than public policy no matter how skillfully crafted, can best determine investment decisions ....
[TJ ax preferences are like drugs, sir. From 1986 to 1991 we had
withdrawal trauma . Now, we have learned to live with this,
and we have learned to play on a level playing fi eld . If we
reintroduce tax preferences, that takes away the underpin nings of the '86 Act and what it was founded upon - and th is
was low rates with few breaks.") and Harry Su lliv an ("The
Tax Reform Action Coalition was formed in June of 1985 by
business associations and corporations which were committed to enacti ng federal tax reform which would substa ntially reduce the then existing high statutory ind ividual and
corporate tax rates in return for the reduction of preferences
in the code ... . The Tax Reform Act of 1986 represented much
more than a revamping of the tax code. It represented a victory
of principle over spec ial interes t, and demonstrated that
American poliCies can work to the benefit of all of the people,
not just the chosen few . . . . TRAC's unifying glue that hold s
this together, is that all of these businesses and individuals
usi ng their after-tax dollars will make the bes t market
decisions . ... ").
53 President Clinton 's remarks to the U.s. Chamber of
Commerce's 1993 National Business Action Rally, Feb. 23,
1993 ("I have offered a plan ... that cuts spending with real
specific cuts, not rhetoric about overall caps, with tax increases that I believe are progressive, although none are free
of pain. And with targeted, specific investments to grow this
economy.").
s4Kies, "The Current Political, Budgetary, and Tax Policy
Environment Suggests the Possibility of Major Tax Legisla tion in the 100th Congress," 35 Tax Notes 179 (April 13, 1987).
In theory, increases on the corporate side were to partially
pay for the rate decreases on the individual side. See Lee,
"E ntity Classification and Int egra tion : Publicly Traded
Partnerships, Persona I Se rv ice Co rpora tion and the Tax
Legislative Process," 8 Va. Tax Rev. 57, 71 -2 (1988).
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with raising the top rates so long as he could agree
with the use of the resulting revenues. 55 Therefore, if
Congress can now raise the ordinary income tax rates
at the top without restoring that much of the old
preferences, the liberal element of the bipartisan coalition will rejoin partisan Democrats. Remember, the
bipartisan coalition of conservatives favoring low
rates, and liberals favoring lower preferences, passed
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 for different reasons. 56
The case for increasing the income tax rates at the
top without really restoring that much of the old
preferences rests on the case for restoring part of the
late 1970s to early 1980s erosion of progressivity at the
top from 35 percent to the 20s. Essentially that case is
that Congress cut the rates at the top in a trickledown
experiment that failed; therefore, the old effective rate
at the top should be restored. Bill Clinton campaigned
for the presidency in part on this argument.
D. Revival of Old-Time Tax: Sheltering Unlikely
With a generic capital gains rate of 28 percent and
PAL relaxed only as to real estate professionals (with
the revenue losses being offset by lengthening the
depreciable "life" of commercial real estate improvements - I would prefer using full section 1250 recapture first as discussed below), and the bitter aftertaste
of the 1980s tax shelter implosion still lingering, traditional tax shelters will not likely come back in force as
the chairman of the ABA Section of Taxation testified
in the March 17, 1993 House Ways and Means hearing.
I would add, as well, the factors of a 20-percent nationwide vacancy rate in office space and bust in real estate
values following the 1980s bubble57 and attendant inability to obtain bank financing for real estate purchases and construction. 58
I unders tand, based on anecdotal evidence from
practitioners and government officials, that PAL has
effectively curbed the use of tax shelters by passive
investors. The proposed loosening of the PAL
provisions affects only "real estate professionals," i.e.,
"more than half of the personal services the taxpayer
performs in a trade or business during the taxable year

55Cloud, "Bradley Sounds Warning Bells as 1986 Tax Deal
Unravels," 51 Congo Q. Wkly Rept. 739 (March 27, 1993). For
earlier indications of Senator Bradley's willingness to raise the
rate at the top if not accompanied by a capital gains giveback,
see 136 CongoRec. S 15769 (Senate October 18, 1990 Daily Ed.);
138 Congo Rec. S 3103 (Senate March 10, 1992 Daily Ed.). Joseph
Minarik explained that such freezing was intended to widen
the political support for the consensus Bradley built for the
lowering of the rates through curbing of preferences notion,
which underlay the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Minarik, "How
Tax Reform Came About," 37 Tax Notes 139 (Dec. 28, 1987).
56Bittker, "Tax Reform - Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow," 44 Washington & Lee L. Rev. 11, 14 (1987) (liberals moved
by fairness or horizontal equity and conservatives by
economic efficiency or level playing field).
57138 Congo Rec. 53378 (Senate March 12, 1993 Daily Ed.)
(Remarks of Senator Bill Bradley, D-N.J.).
58"ln Search of Borrowers," The Economist 71 (April 3,
1993) (since peak in 1987, commercial property values have
probably halved and so banks have been refusing to accept
commercial property as collateral).
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are in real property trades or businesses in which he
materially participates." The stated reason was the
"disadvantage" that real estate professionals under
current section 469 may not use "losses arising from
the rental of real property .. . to offset income from
other aspects of the taxpayer's real estate business . .. .
[O]ther business professionals ... are allowed to
deduct losses from activities in which they materially
participate." I understand from further anecdotal
evidence that IRS field agents looking for adjustments
under section 469 must perforce focus on real estate
professionals or quasi-professionals, since the true passive investors had long ago dropped out, particularly
if their capital contributions were called for in annual
stages. In any event, Congress passed this provision
last year in the vetoed H .R. 4210. Its cost, while not
that cheap at $2.2 billion over the five-year revenue
window, is to be paid for by lengthening the" depreciable" life for real estate to 40 or so years, which would
raise $2.4 billion over the window. This reduces the
annual section 168 deduction for real estate from
around 3 percent to 2.5 percent per year on a
straightline basis. When one considers that the first
1984 Treasury report would have provided under its
indexed system a 3-percent deduction for 63 years, 59
this seems unfair. Of course, this Treasury report would
at the same time have reduced a real estate owner's
interest deduction by the rate of inflation while increasing the owner's depreciable basis for inflation (which
is why 3 percent for 60 odd years works as long as
inflation averages 3 percent or more).
A fairer policy answer, assuming the revenue is
there or in conjunction with a less harsh useful life for
real estate improvements, would be to tax all real estate
section 1231 and perhaps section 1221 "capital gains"
of real estate professionals as full ordinary income, at
least to the extent of losses so exempted under PAL,
i.e., a real estate recapture rule that really works. The
logic supporting this linkage of PAL exception and
ordinary income upon disposition is manifested by a
comparison of (a) the definition in the legislative history of the 1986 act of "material participation," viz.,
involvement on a "regular, continuous and substantial
basis" with (b) a classic definition of trade or business
status barring capital gains treatment contained in Fahs
V. Crawford, 161 F.2d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1947), viz. , "Carrying on a business . . . implies an occupational undertaking to which one habitually devotes time, attention, or
effort with substantial regularity."
Alternatively, full recapture under section 1250 of
all prior depreciation up to gain should be enacted . The
original reason stated in 1964 for limiting depreciation
recapture under section 1250 as to improved real estate
to the excess of accelerated depreciation over
straightline was that real estate was held longer than,
for example, machinery, and hence, was more subject
to inflation.60 The truth was the real estate lobby chose
this 1964 slap on the wrist while giving up (a) ration-

59 2 Treasury Department Report to the President, Tax Reform
for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth 161 (1984).

60S. Rep . No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess . 132 (1964) .
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alization of useful Jives, and (b) the investment tax
credit, which personal property h ad obtained in 1962
as part of a package including full recapture under
section 1245 for depreciation taken up to gain realized. 61 N ow that a n investment tax credit for personal
property will not be enacted, real estate and personal
property will be treated more alike if a shorter life than
proposed by the administration for rea l estate is obtained. In that event, full recapture under section 1250
on the model of section 1245 with no offsets sh ould
apply to all dispositions of improved real estate up to
depreciation taken even b y nonprofe ssionals if a
generic 28-percent capital gains rate applies to section
1231 assets. Compare the 1992 administration
proposals. A compromise might be to limit the rate
increase to the 36 percent or even the 39.6-percent rate
rather than the 41-percent rate at the top with PEP and
Pease. Someone active enough in real estate activities
to escape PAL should not be able to obtain capital gains
treatment (including section 1231) as to improved rea l
estate used in those activities.
E. Implicit Rule of 28
A member of Congress once said that the best thing
to come out of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was the
individual AMT rate of then 21 percent, now 24 p ercent, and hopefully soon a graduated 26 percent to 28
percent. I don't regard it as the Single best thing, but
as part of a troika, with PAL and repeal of the capital
gains preference, that worked to assure that mos t high income individual taxpayers wou ld be taxed a t much
the same effective rate . All other income g roup s
clustered around the mean . High-income taxpayers
alone manifested a range from a zero effec ti ve rate to
just below the top nominal rate, as discussed in ll.B .
above.
In short, the '86 act effected horizontal equi ty, not a
change in vertical equity. Thus, with an average effective rate at the top in the high 20s, a maximum capital
gains rate of 28 percent, a top rate at 28 percent (actually 33 percent with the original bubble rate), and an
AMT of 21 p ercen t, most taxpayers at the top would
be taxed in the high 20s one way or another. Raising
the AMT rate to a two-step graduated rate with a top
rate of 28 percent and keeping the generic capital gains
rate at 28 percent are further steps towards horizontal
eq uity. The 42-percent or so top ordinary rate, however,
will result in some gain in vertical equity, but a cost of
some, but perhaps not a major, loss in horizontal equity.
This horizontal inequity is an inevitable byproduct of
the administration's avowed policy of using the code
to implement industrial policy, i.e., growing the

61 Hearings all the President's 1961 Tax Recommendations before
the HOllse Ways and Means Committee, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 995,
997 (1961); see also S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 95
(1962) .
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economy through marginal incentives. 62 In this context,
the proposed targeted small -business preference must
maintain its proposed limitations as well (particularly
subj ecting one-half of the 50-percent preference to the
AMT) or both vertical a nd horizontal equity will be
gravely a t risk.63 If the net proposals increase the highincome effective rate and do not create that much
deviation from that effective rate from renewed
preferences, liberals in Congress shou ld support the
proposed rate increase cum limited preferences. After
all, Clinton won a mandate on higher rates at the top,
and he a lways plugged targeted small-busi ness preferen ces on the s tump .
F. Increased Complexity, but Only at the Margin
Complexity in transactional tax planning, i.e., converting services or portfolio income into capital gains,
undoubtedly will increase with the reintroduction of a
s ubstantial capital gains preference. This seems to be
the tax bar' s main concern, which is not surprising,
since this is the corner of capi tal transac tions on which
tax planners are called to provide advice . But transformation of income, perhaps other than through growth
stocks, is at the margins in terms of revenue, as Treasury was surprised to discover in the 1960s.64 My estimates, derived from early 1960s a nd late 1970s Treas ury data, of the li kely breakdown of types of capita l
gains annual income show the reasons why : 45 percent

62"The tax program, as you know, is highly progressive,
and some say tha t it is so progressive that it will discourage
people from reinvesting . I wou ld just ask you to stud y the
whole thing . We provide for the first time in the history of the
country a permanent investment tax credit for small businesses for 90 percent of the employers who have 40 percent
of the workers but create a majority of the jobs in this country.
We provided alterna ti ve minimum tax relief for the big capital-intensive businesses of this count ry who have told us
repeatedly that the alternative minimum tax treatment in the
present tax code actually discourages people from making
investments. We have provided some relief from the passive
loss provisions of the income tax code for people who are in
the real estate business, beca use I think that has aggravated
the condition not only of real estate but of some of our banks
and con tributed to the credit crunch. So I think there will be
both direct benefits to real estate and indirect benefits to
people who have to get bank financing by changing thi s passive loss provision.... So I ask you to look at it as a whole
package, and to recognize that. We have to aga in mov e away
from a tax system that is based too much on fixed-rate taxes
like excise and payroll taxes, more toward income t,'\Xes that
have also offsetting incentives to invest. I believe that this is
the proper direction to go."
Clinton's Chamber of Commerce speech, Silpra.
63CBO Director Robert Reischauer fears that Clinton's incentives partially offsetting the rate increases might not
themselves undo the 1986 act, but "they might be th e
'dynamic' to set its overthrow in motion ." Jakubowicz, "Reischauer Worried Clinton Plan May Undo Tax Reform, " 1993
Tax Noles Today 86-1 (April 20, 1993). I would hope that the
pay-as-you-go principle would retard such tendency.
64Hearings on Presidenl's 1963 Tax Message before Ihe HailS':
COlllmittee all Ways alld Mealls (Part 2), 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
606 (1963) (Statement of Secretary of the Treasury Douglas
Dillon) .
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public stock, 5 percent close corporations, 25 percent
real estate, 15 percent installment sales (mostly businesses and land), 1 or 2 percent livestock, 1 or 2 percent
timber and coal royalties, etc. Transactional costs from
complexity, in theory, would reduce aggressive capital
gains planning at the margin. My guess is that effecting
any such trend would require the Service to focus
audit, technical advice, litigation, and ultimately "substantial authority" attention to the conversion areas,
should they redevelop rather than focus almost exclusively on real estate as in the past. Section 14206 of
H.R. 2141, OBRA 1993, which treats gains from certain
ostensible sales of capital assets as ordinary income
where the economic substance is indistinguishable
from a loan in terms of risk and return, is narrower
than the traditional conversion transactions encouraged by a significant differential between top capital and ordinary rates. Such opportunities were first
described by then-Special Tax Adviser to Treasury Randolph Paul in 1942 in 1942 Hearings on Revenue Revision
Before the House Ways and Means Committee (Part 2), 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1630-31 (1942), and closely examined
by Professor Stanley Surrey, first in the 1955 Joint
Economic Committee Hearings held by Tax Policy Subcommittee Chairman Rep. Wilbur Mills, D-Ark., and
then in "Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation," 69 Ham. L. Rev. 985 (1956), and in the 1959 Tax
Revision Compendium.
G. Do Tax Incentives Really Work Anyway?
Chairman Rostenkowski: Well, Dr. Tyson, we
wrote a tax bill here that was in the minds of
many of us a simplification bill. Do you fill out
your own income tax?
Dr. Tyson: No, I have an accountant fill out my
income tax.
Chairman Rostenkowski: Well, I read all your
suggestions and I'm not suggesting that I disagree with this. But, the fact of the matter is,
investment tax credits, capital gains, enterprise
zones, are we going to muck up the code at all?
Dr. Tyson: I think what we're trying to do here
is to find a way to use the tax system to encourage
those kinds of economic activities which the
country most needs right now.
Now, using the tax system in a targeted way
does indeed make the tax system more complicated. So, my answer to that would be that we're
trying to strike a balance here between more
simplification, which would of course make it
easier, and incentives that are targeted.
Chairman Rostenkowski: I don't want to disagree with that. I think that if we can target areas
where we have a slump in the economy or a problem in the industry that we ought to do something like.
But, as I've been sitting on this committee, it
almost comes into focus that once you give business or the taxpayer a break in an area - like an
incentive - there's no way you can rescind that
incentive. I mean, it's like a sick patient. You
know, once you give them all the medicine and
TAX NOTES, June 7, 1993

they get cured and you send them out of the
hospital, they don't take the medicine anymore.
But, American business starts making this a
part of doing business. That's what I always
worry about. I, for one, feel I'd like the private
sector to do a lot more. If government, in this
committee, we can create an atmosphere where
they're going to do more, once they're well and
active, we can take that away.
It's always been here, whenever you recommend you're going to do something for a fiveyear period, about in the second year, th e
business community is sitting down there saying,
" Well , can you give us another extension for four
more years." Now it's not five years, it's nine
years.
That's what worries me about this. I think that
it is a bold package. I've endorsed it. I just hope
that when we eliminate the deficit or curtail our
spending, that we're broad enough to understand
that good business, in my opinion, makes investment when the time and climate is right and not
because we give them incentives.
March 9, 1993 House Ways and Means Hearing.6s A
witness at the March 25, 1993 Senate hearings pointed
out that studies indicate that incentives are not the
determinative factor in capital expenditures anyway.66
Corporate interest groups rejected a narrow investment tax credit that would give back only a fraction of

65S ee Jakubowicz, "Rosty to Administration: 'Are You
Going to Muck Up the Code?" 93 Tax Notes Today 55-3 (March
15, 1993).
66"1 think the - my experience and some of the studies,
particularly some current studies by Professor Kasari at the
Washington University of 51. Louis, point out that the cost of
capital is ordinarily not as big a factor in determining invest·
ment as is generally believed.
I think the bigger factors are cash flow or profitability and
sales growth."
Unofficial Transcript of Finance Hearing on Deficit Reduction March 25, 1993 (Statement of S.J . Levy, Chairman, the
Jerome Levy Institute, Bard College). Senate Finance Committee Chairman Moynihan, D-N .Y., added anecdotal
evidence.
The Chairman. We have respectable anecdotal evidence ... .
[W]hen you ask a group of businessmen what makes them
decide to build a plant .... The only thing Ira asks is, "Can I
sell the damned stuff?" Id.
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the revenues from a two-point increase for the top 2,700
corporations with over $10 million in profits.67
III. PROGRESSIVE RATES AND SMALL BUSINESSES

A. The Imbalance Between Inside and
Outside Rates
Beginning in the mid-1930s, when Congress enacted
(a) the graduated "inside" corporate income tax rate,
thereby decoupling the rate for small businesses from
the rate for large corporations, and (b) a soon-to-berepealed tax on undistributed corporate profits, the
small-business inside corporate rate was far below the
maximum outside rate on individuals. Double taxation
was largely a myth, since dividends were rarely paid
by close corporations and retained earnings were realized at the shareholder level (if the business was sold
before death) in the form of capital gains. These rules,
together with the codified General Utilities doctrine
(under which a liquidating corporation was not taxed
on unrealized capital appreciation as to assets distributed pursuant to the liquidation or sold pursuant
to a "timely" liquidation) resulted in less taxation than
if the business were conducted directly, as Congress
was repeatedly told in hearings .68
In short, the dose C corporation has long obtained
preferential rates for small (currently up to $50,000 to
$75,000) annual profits reinvested in the business. Until
1981, a smaller preference (around 50 percent inside
versus 70 percent outside) even was provided for larger
incomes. But the Tax Reform Act of 1986 established a
new "equilibrium" at higher levels of retained earnings
with a maximum permanent inside corporate rate of
34 percent and a maximum permanent outside individual rate of 28 percent. 69 Actually, it mostly

67"1 would like to recommend and I am recommending to
the committee on behalf of the coalition, that we not increase
the corporate rates and that we be very, very careful as we
look at the individual rates, and in particular, if all that rate
increase means is that you are going to tum around and take
$3 and give back a dollar of some kind of incentive, then Jeave
the incentive out. ... I think you set up a condition that brings
out behavior that isn't in the best interests of the economy or
individual firms. You start with a premise that we are going
to increase the rates and then remove it and say, well, wait,
the rate stays but we don't give you the crumbs, then I think
everybody has got to say, listen we want to get back anything
we can get back. But the premise is short of faulty to set up
that inefficient - it is not going to do an awful lot for businesses except create some jobs in accounting and it is going
to create a lot of Tax Revenue Agent jobs." March 31 House
Ways and Means hearing testimony of Harry Sullivan. Data
as to impact of two-point increase in the top corporate rate is
from testimony by Secretary of Treasury Bentsen at February
24, 1993 Senate Finance Committee hearing on Clinton's
economic proposal.
68See authorities cited in Lee, supra note 54, at 95 note 141,
69 At the same time, Congress in the Tax Reform Act of
1986 increased the base for the lowest corporate rates (15
percent) from $25,000 to $50,000 in retained income, apparently in response to the complaint of small business as to
the first 1984 Treasury Report's elimination of the graduated
corporate rate. See Birnbaum & Murray, Showdown at Gucci
Gulch 80 (1987).
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reversed the prior disequilibrium between top corporate and individual rates . With this new imbalance
favoring direct taxation of the owner at annual retained
income in excess of $100,000, the number of 5 corporations grew from around 500,000 to 1,500,000 or more 70
out of 3,500,000 or so active corporations. The proposed
increase in individual rates to 36 percent and around
41 percent while the top corporate rate for all but the
biggest corporations (2,700 with $10 million in profits)
remains at 34 percent would shift the balance back to
"growth" C corporations for larger retained earnings,?1

B. Politics
The impact of the proposed rate increases on smallbusiness owners is an important political issue. In the
1992 congressional debate on similar rate increases (although starting at considerably higher break points for
the 36-percent bracket and millionaire's surtax), Treasury and conservatives claimed that they would bear
as much as 70 percent of the burden of the rate increase.72
Senate Finance Chairman Lloyd Bentsen, O-Tex ., then

70Publication 16, Statistics of Income, 1989 Corporate Income
Tax Returns, pp. 4, 9, indica tes that for 1989 there were
1,422,967 S corporation returns out of 3,627,863 corporate
returns, up from 1,257,191 in 1988, U27,905 in 1987, and
826,216 in 1986. Thus, by now, there may well be 2 million S
corporations.
71March 31 House Ways and Means hearing testimony of
Harry Sullivan. "One of the things that we talked about in
this double taxation - we start today from a snapshot where
there is the top corporate rate is 34; the individual rate is 31.
So the corporate rate is three points higher. For many people
in the public, as well as some people in the Congress they
think it has always been that way. It has only been since 1988
and '87 that the corporate rate was higher than the individual
rate. That is how you got away from a little bit of the double
taxation. The rate right now, the three-pOint negative spread,
with the corporate higher - it was six - when we did the
transition after the '86 Act, it was 1.5 points. The corporate rate
was 40; the maximum individual was 38. Pre '86 that differential was four points; where the corporate rate was four points
lower. So there has been an equilibrium between Ss and subchapter C corporations and individual rates. We have lived
now for six years with that equilibrium or with the new equilibrium - the only time since 1909 that the corporate rate was
higher than the individual rate - 1987 on."
720n the House floor in Winter 1992, members of Congress
opposing the House Democrats' proposed rate increase to 35
percent, distorting statistics, argued that 90 percent of the
impact of the new high-income rates would fall on small
businesses conducted as pass- through entities, i.e., a farm,
sole proprietorship, partnership, or a subchapter S corporation. E.g., 138 Congo Reg. H 449 (House Feb. 19, 1992 Daily Ed.)
(Remarks of Rep . McCollum, R-Fla.). This number was far too
high, reflecting the percentage of all business enterprises that
pass-through entities constituted on a per capita basis, rather
than the percentage of total an nual reported income of all
high-income individuals that small-business people reported
(and even then at higher income levels small-business taxpayers may have substantial amounts of investment income).
The Senate debate in March 1992 delineated the issue. Treasury
(Footnote continued on next page.)
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disputed the accuracy of such estimates/3 and now as
Clinton's Secretary of Treasury, has come up with his own
statistics - only 4.2 percent of sma11-business people
will see an ordinary income rate increase.7 4 Based on

(Footnote 72 continued.)
and Senate Republicans claimed that "approx.i mately 70 percent of those who would have been affected by the tax rate
increases proposed by Congress in the failed tax reform. package
are farmers and those in sole proprietorships, S corporations, and
partnerships. More than $40 billion in revenue would have come
from higher taxation of S corporations alone . . . ." Speech by
Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy Fred T. Gold~erg
Jr., former Commissioner, speaking at the Tax Executives
Institute's midyear conference March 30,1991, in Washington,
D.C., quoted in Zeidner, "Goldberg Says Tax Increases Hurt
Small Businesses, Stall Job Creation," 92 Tax Notes Today 69-1;
accord, 138 Congo Rec. 53270 (Senate March 11, 1992 Daily Ed.)
(Remarks of Senator Dominici, R-N .M.)
to 65 perce.nt of t.he
tax increase will be added to returns With small-busmess mcome). The 5 corporation "share" thus would have constituted
about 42 percent of the total increase.
73Chairman Bentsen correctly criticized Treasury's 70 percent as counting every partner in 1985 as a small business
person. Most partners were members of tax she.lter partnerships at this time and most were not small-busmess people
(as contrasted with professionals whom many members of
Congress no longer regard as favored small businesse~) and
profitable partnerships probably are concentrated. m the
professions as well (accountants and attorneys) and m stock
brokerage houses - and very few sole proprietors or .individual farmers come within the high income categones.
Similarly,S corporations, particularly those formed after 1987,
include many professional corporations. See 138 Congo Rec.
53281 (Senate Ma.rch 11, 1992 Daily Ed.) (Remarks of Chairman
Bentsen) ("What the administration has done is most misleading. Roughly two-thirds of those affect~ b'y ~he new fourth
bracket are small business. What they did IS Include all tax·
payers who reported income from sole proprietorships,S c?rporations, farms, and partnerships. ~e last two ~atego~les
contain many taxpayers with net busmess losses, Includmg
many tax shelters. So I do not believe that is a representative
statement. The way the administration put the numbers together
I think brings about a situation which is not representative:"); id.
at 53652 (Senate March 13, 1992 Daily Ed.) (Remarks of Chairman
Bentsen); id. at S 4009, S 4020 (Senate March 20, 1992 (Remarks
of Chairman Bentsen in Conference Debate).
74Mr. Bentsen. Well, this plan is definitely pro-small business. We heard some arguments last year. And I pointed out
to many Senators who were inaccurately using num~ers. I
am even more familiar with these numbers now for thiS last
year. We have them for the last year from Treasury. So let's
present the data.
First of all, it is unreasonable to assume that every person
with more than one dollar of business income on their return
is a small-business person. Second, only a small percentage
of small-business owners are affected.
To determine if the taxpayer is a bona fide small-business
person, it is reasonable to look only at those. taxpay~rs who
had active business income that exceeded theIr wage mcome.
And of the nearly seven million taxpayers with business
income in excess of their wages, only 300,000 or 4.2 percent
would face higher marginal rates.
February 24, 1993 Senate Finance Committee Hea.ring.
These computations apparently understate small-busmess
taxpayers who draw out most of the corporate profit as compensation in either a C or 5 corporation.

(?O
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widely cited unofficial estimates by a private firm
providing financial planning for high-income taxpayers, it seems that small-business people make up
approximately 16 percent of taxpayers at the 31-percent bracket, 20 percent or so at the $250,000 surtax
level, and somewhere in between for the 36-percent
bracket. 7s r suspect that these percentages are close to
the actual burden of the individual rate increases on
small-business people. Moreover, at the higher income
levels, half of the income is from passive sources interest, dividends, and capital gains.

7SFortune put business owners at only 18 percent (and
CEOs at 31 percent) of the top I percent by in.c ome in 1~91.
The top 1 percent consisted in 1991 of the followmg categon~ :
(1) corporate executives, 31 percent (down from 44 percent m
1981); (2) business owners, 18 percent (down from 24 percent);
attorneys, 13 percent (down from 19 percent); (3) doctors and
dentists, 15 percent (up from 10 percent); and (4) others (such
as sports stars, actors, and consultants), 23 percent (up ~ro~
3 percent). Fisher, "The New Debate Over the Very Rich,
Fortune 42, 44 (June 29, 1992) (source, PSI, Inc., a financial
services research firm in Tampa, Fla.). The Was/lington Post,
relying on the same source, subsequently reported that, at the
much higher $1 million of annual income level, 22 percent of
the taxpayers were business owners and 22 percent were
senior corporate executives. Farhi, "A Rise in the Rich Prompts
a Debate, " The Washington Post A-I Col. 4, A-12 Col. 1 (Saturday, July 11, 1992) (source, PSI, Inc.; 1991 data). Most Significantly, 36 percent were retired and the other category was
only 3 percent, suggesting thai the "oth~r category," Fisher,
supra, included retirees (although that article also states ~t ~he
top I -percent level 15 percent are retired) . At the $1 mllhon
level, medical profeSsionals accounte? for 9 percent ~nd attorneys for 8 percent . [d . And regardmg households ~n 1991
with incomes over $75,000 or net worth over $300,000 mcluding primary residence: 26 percent were corporate executives
or managers; 16 percent were business owners; 9 percent were
technical specialists; 4 percent were physicians; 3 percent were
accountants; and 3 percent were attorneys. Cooper and Friedman, "The Rich in America," U.S . News & World Report 34,35
(Nov. 18, 1991). A New York Times article reprinted in the
Congressional Record during this debate stated that most ~f the
top high-income taxpayers probably were small-bus~n~ss
people and CEOs of large corporatio~s, bu~ half o~ theIr. 10come came from investment income Includmg capItal gams.
Nasar, "Even Among the Well-Off, the Richest Get Richer,"
The New York Times, D-l, col. 2, at D-24, cols. 3-4 (Thursday
March 5, 1992) (majority of top 20 percent probably own closely
held businesses or manage Fortune 500 companies; wealthy
get half of their income from investments which surged in the
1980s; "The early 1990s have already clipped the wings of a
lot of high-fliers as corporations have shed executives, law
firms have down-sized, businesses have failed, and real estate
values have collapsed."); reprinted in 138 Congo Rec. 53276,
53918 (Senate March 11 and 19, 1992, respectively Daily Ed .).
And I might add the LBO mania had abated . In . sh~rt, the
speculative boom has collapsed. The average fa':IlIly mcome
of the top 1 percent declined to roughly $350,000 In 1991 from
$410,000 in 1989. Fisher, supra at 42-3. Indeed, the top 1 percent
had peaked at average income of $617,000 earlier in 1988,
Cooper and Friedman, supra at 34-5, before the leveraged
buyout wave had ebbed. This post-boom trend at ~he . top
income level probably bodes ill for the revenue projectIOns
from the individual rate increases at the lOp.
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C. Inside and Outside Disparities Before

In the 1930s and again in the 1960s, populist members of Congress criticized the lower inside subchapter
C rates on smaller amounts of retained income in comparison to the higher individual rates applicable to
partnership earnings. Both times, the answer from
Treasury was the same: such small-business people
should incorporate. And they did so under the 1954
code, as the number of dose corporations grew from
several hundred thousand to several million, almost
half of which are S corporations under the 1986 code.
D. The Mann-Hancock Proposal
Mark Mann, a Chicago tax accountant representing
closely held businesses, proposed at the March 31,1993
House Ways and Means hearings that a "materia lly
participating" entrepreneur's annual share of income
retained by a passthrough entity (partnership or 5 corporation), otherwise taxable at higher than the 31-percent rate, be currently taxed instead of at the
entrepreneur's level at the maximum corporate rate of
34 percent (up to $10 million of income) with an additional (deferred) tax of 5.6. percent (39.6 percent - 34
percent) triggered by distribution of thi s previously
taxed but not distributed income. Obviously, having
read Mann's hearing statement beforehand, Rep. Mel
Hancock, R-Mo., who "happen[s] to have a subchapter
5 corporation in the private world," questioned several
witnesses at the March 21, 1993 House hearing as to
the advisability of taxing an S corporation shareholder
on his share of income left in the company "at the
corporate rate until such time as he takes it out, maybe
five years later. Then he would pay the higher individual tax rate. [in excess of the 34 percent already
paid] ." Rep . Hancock explained that "the tax code
should be an incentive for him to leave money in the
company and expand his company."
The Mann/Hancock proposal certainly would be an
answer to the rhetoric that the proposed individual rate
increases at the top would bear too heavily on small
business. It also would clearly tax "capital" reinvested
in the pass through entity lighter than labor (although
at the $140,000 taxable family income level and certainly
at the $250,000 level, that fact begins to lose its populist
appeal). The Mann/Hancock proposal is, in my eyes,
therefore, preferable only to (a) scrapping the individual rate increases at the top altogether, or (b) more
likely winning over the conservative coalition (particularly on the Senate side) by coupling with the rate
increases a substantial individual generic capital gains
cut. It thus may be a "second best" solution.
Serious consideration of this next logical step in
schedular income 76 would require addressing a number of issues. Would amounts taxed at 34 percent be
subject to the higher tax at the shareholder/partner's
death? If so, Congress might want to forgiv e the
deferred tax if the family member inheriting the inter-

76
1 am not in principle opposed to schedular income; in
theory, it should facilitate dividing and conquering special
interest groups.
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est continues in the business for a specified period of,
say, five or eight years. And , by the way, what would
the deferred ta x be? The rate that would have applied
in the year deferred? (With PEP a nd Pease?) Or simply
the maximum rates at the time of distribution notwithstanding bunching? I lean toward the latter, for
ease of administration and as a little toll charge for the
deferral. Also, it is likely that the deferred amounts
won't be withdrawn but, rather, the business will be
sold first. At least the deferred amounts should be
"recaptured" at 39.6 percent, etc ., upon a sale. Indeed,
arguably, none of the gain on the sale should be afforded generic capital gains treatment as a further toll
charge for deferral. Should nonrecognition transfers of
the stock or partnership interest as by gift or merger
continue the deferral? I think not, since the aSSignment
of income doctrine would be vitiated as to such transfers. Congress chose, however, the opposite path in
1962 in section 1250, despite Treasury's desire for gifts
to trigger recapture.
Even more difficult would be fashioning the rules
for which subchapter 5 or partnership small businesses
should qualify, and especially what the retained entity
income must be invested in. The first cut as to qualifying businesses would be to adopt the standards of excluded bu sinesses and corporations under the
proposed targeted small business capital gain. Similarly, investments of retained passthrough entity income
in stock or in real estate should be limited. But the more
difficult areas would be avoiding the trouble spots of
the current accumu la ted earnings tax . For example,
reserves for future expansion should not qualify. An
alternative would be to allow the deferral in year one
for amounts "held" in such a reserve, but reopen year
one if expansion does note occur (or perhaps begin)
within a specified period such as three years. Loans to
the shareholder/partner or related parties should be
treated as distributions.
Mann asked in his hearing statement, but not in his
actual testimony, for both the "corporate rate" on
retained pass through earnings and targeted small business capital gains for S corporations. This front end
and back end preference is not justified .
If Congress continues to provide graduated inside
taxation of close C corporations, targeted capital gains
might be defensible (although there is both a front and
back end preference). But the ideal would be mandatory passthrough of close C corporation income for
taxation purposes coupled with a 34-percent rate on
retained income reinvested in expansion with the
deferred tax upon distribution/sale, etc. The billion or
so dollar annual subsidy in the graduated close C corporation rates would go a long way to paying for the
lost/deferred revenues from using the 34-percent rate
rather than the 36-percent/millionaire's surtax, PEP,
and Pease as to qualified accumulations. This would
favor the larger small-bus iness owner at the expense
of the sma ller owner, but there is no sound tax policy
for the graduated inside close C corporation rate when
the owners materially participate. See my testimony at
the Tax Treatment of Master Limited Partnerships
Hearing before the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures, 100th Cong., 1st
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Sess. 343-50 (1987). See also Lee, supra 8 Va. Tax Rev.
57,88,94-5, 101, 107-09 (1988).
IV. SMALL-BUSINESS CAPITAL GAINS CUT

President Clinton campaigned on, among numerous
other promises, a targeted small business tax cut. 77 The
proposed targeted small business capital gains cut of
a 50-percent exclusion (maximum income tax rate of
14 percent) of gain realized upon the sale or exchange
of qualified small business stock held for five years or
more constitutes a paradigm Clinton tax provision: (1)
it is relatively inexpensive even assuming that it does
attract outside capital so that it is a "leveraged" provision/8 (2) if it works, more jobs will be created since
most new jobs currently are provided by small businesses;19 (3) favoring small businesses over big businesses is consistent with Clinton's populism; and (4)
consistent with the president's pattern of promoting
the ideas of others, the provision was originated by
Senator Dale Bumpers, D-Ark., a long-time political
ally of the president.
A. 'Sunset' Provision
Distributionally, the proposed targeted capital gains
cut to a 14-percent maximum rate after a five-year
holding period for sales of qualified small business

17Bill Clinton, Putting People First 9 (1992) ("My plan
would ... (h]elp small businesses and entrepreneurs by offering a 50·percent tax exclusion to those who take risks by
making long-term investments in new businesses."); "The
1992 Campaign: Transcript of 3d TV Debate between Bush,
Clinton and Perot," The New York Times A-20, col. 1 (Oct. 20,
1992) ("We also provide . . . tax relief in terms of new incentives for ... new small businesses .... ").
78Remarks by President Clinton and his aides abound with
references to leveraging government investments so as to
attract larger private investments, as may be seen by searching NEXIS with the terms "Clinton w/i 25 lever!." This is
what President Clinton means by "public-private partnerships," also a searchable term. See generally Neikirk, "Clinton
Preparing Government Overhaul," Chicago Triblme, C-6 (Sunday Nov. 22, 1992) ("With budgets tight, the federal role
should be to use precious dollars as incentives and as
leverage to accomplish its goals.").
79President Clinton based his skewing of tax benefits to
small business on the ground that the restructuring of big
business resulted in a reduction in employment at that level
every year in the 1980s, which until recently was more than
offset by the creation of jobs in small business. Clinton's Feb.
23, 1993 Remarks to the United States Chamber of Commerce
and Feb. 17 State of the Union Address; accord Testimony of
Secretary of the Treasury Bentsen at Feb. 24, 1993 Senate
Finance Committee hearings ("small businesses are vital to
our economy, since they are the major source now of new
jobs."). The smaller firms with revenues of under $5 million
constitute 90 percent of the firms and employ 40 percent of
the work force. President Clinton's Feb. 17, 1993 State of the
Union Address. But see March 25 Senate Finance Committee
hearing testimony of Herbert Stein ("1 am not in favor of all
of the preferences for small business that are in the
president's plan. I think they reflect the kind of romantic
notion about the exceptional contribution that small business
makes to employment and innovation in this country. And I
do not think that is justified.").
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corporation stock would be the worst of any recent
capital gains proposal, since the average income of
small-business people is much higher than the average
income of those realizing capital gains in generalso and
virtually no low-income individuals own stock in small
business corporations. But the proposal probably
would have minimal effect on the effective rate at the
top unless it succeeded beyond the wildest dreams of
Senator Bumpers to attract outside capital. s1 If it did,
the benefits probably would trickle down in the form
of new jobs. So, like then-Senator, now Finance Com mittee Chairman, Moynihan in the 1978 debate over
increasing the generic preference to open up capital for
start-ups, I might be willing to try a targeted small
business gain . But I suspect it would most likely turn
out be a subsid y s2 to people starting new mom and
pops and high-techs (more machine tool companies
than Silicon Valley start-ups) anyway, rather than an
incentive that actually attracts outside capital (now any
noncommercial financing is from the "entrepreneur,"
family, and friends). My guess is the primary effect of
the small bus iness provision would be psychological
- see how the administration likes small businesses
- and in the real world, easing the credit crunch as
the president is doing will have much more effect.
Therefore, this time the experiment should have a sunset provision. s3 Only such a provision will answer
Chairman Rostenkowski's fear (expressed in the context of the investment tax credit) that Clinton's tax
proposal will result in a subsidy after the need for a
remedial incentive has passed and the plea of John
White, Ph.D., testifying at the March 25, 1993 Senate

SOJ'his is mostly intuitive, but in 1978 Treasury Secretary
Michael Blumenthal said the former was the case. The 10:1 or
$1 million cap would mitigate this, but the biggest factor
would be the 50 percent of exclusion being subject to the AMT,
resulting in a 21-percent rate for an individual at the proposed
second 28-percent AMT rate.
sll estimate that no more than 20 percent or so of high-income individuals are small-business people. Furthermore,
the preference would apply only to small-business stock issued after 1992, which, in any event, would tend to be once
in a lifetime sales (although frequently installment reported
over five years or more).
82 By this, I mean it will reward people for doing what they
would have done anyway. Surely, that is the case as to mom
and pops, and I suspect as to most entrepreneurs in general.
83lf neither outside capital comes in nor more ventures are
formed during, say, a five-year window test period, then
small businesses formed after the sunset (probably three
years after the window is closed to give time to determine
the effects), wou ld not qualify. Of course, small businesses
formed from 1993 to the sunset would still get the preference
when they are finally sold. Obviously too academic, but
probably this would be the only way to repeal the small
business preference if it is not increasing the formation or
capitalization of such businesses. The increase in outside
investors over the base would be easy to measure since now
nonexistent. The increase in issuance of new small-business
corporation stock would be very difficult to measure, since
the base should take account of the effect of the economy,
interest rates, and availability of credit in general on new
formations.
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hearings for a mid-course review of the stimulus package in 1997.
B. How Big Is Small?
As far as size goes, the real dividing line between
large and sma ll corporations is probably $100 million
adjus~ed basis in assets (at least when the economy is
boommg). In 1988, the 5,000 corporations with assets
of $250 million or more held 80 percent of corporate
assets and earned 74 percent of corporate income after
~OL deductions. Adding the next set of 5,000 corporations (assets from $100 million to $250 million) raised
the asset totals only to 84 percent and income to 79
percent after NOLs. The numbers for 1989 are similar.
Already, the administration has raised the threshold
from $25 to $50 million in assets.
C. Coverage of S Corporations
The more important issue is whether to cover S corporations. Currently, they constitute almost half of all
small or close corporations and earn probably half of
the income at this level. 84 Not covering them would
make the choice of tax entity for new ventures very
complex. Reversal of the trend to passthrough entities
for small business would be unfortunate, since on a
policy basis, material participants should be taxed
directly on the earnings of the entity they control. If
the code were rigorously enforced and sma ll businesses. conducted as C corporations closely audited,
compliance costs would increase substantially since
most of the corporate tax problems in operation arise
from small businesses carried on as C corporations:
construc~ i ve dividends, unreasonable compensation,
r~demptIOns, accumulated earnings, etc. See my testimony at the Tax Treatment of Master Limited Partnerships Hearings before the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. 343-50 (1987). See also 8 Va . Tax Rev. 57, 107-08
(1988).
On the other h and, due to the p reclusion of partnerships owning S corporation stock as well as the ceiling
on number of owners, it is unlikely that outside highincome individuals will invest heavil y in S corporations (particularly when its income will be taxed at as
high as the low 405 to them). Thus, extension of a
capital gains preference to S corporations would be
even more of a s ubsidy to entrepreneurs who likely
would have gone into business for themselves anyway
and are unlikely to turn that decision on the potential
of a pot of gold capital gains reward 10 to 20 years
down the road. Cutting against this assumption are the
comments by members of Congress across the 1970s
through the early 19905 that most of their small business constituents are most interested in a capital gains

84My estimate is based on the 1988 Corporate Statistics of
Income data showing that S corporations earned almost 10
percent of corporate income and the big 10,000 corporations
earned ~lmost 80 percent, adjusted upward for the continued
growth m the number of S corporations.
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preferen ce for their closely held stock.8s If the individual shareholder's share of S corporation income
is subjected to the highest individual rates, allowing a
back end small business capital gain politically
strengthens the rate increase.
D. Thwarting the Conservative Coalition
Former Commissioner of Internal Revenue Mortimer Caplin and the former Assistant Treasury
Secretary for Tax Policy, Roger Mentz, observed at the
November 1992 Virginia Tax Study Group meeting at
the University of Virginia School of Law that President
Clinton might propose a targeted small business capital preference (as he has), but Congress would likely
pass a generic preference. Th is conventional wisdom
roughly reflects the experience in the House of Presi~ents Kennedy and Carter in 1963 and 1978, respectIvely, and Chairman Rostenkowski in 1989. Once a
limited capital proposal was on the table, conservative
(primarily Southern) Democrats joined with
Republicans to vote for a generic preference. Until the
filibuster by Senate Republicans against President
Clinton's economic plan, I predicted that the conservative coalition on capital gains would not arise this time,
pri~arily .due to high lost revenue cost of a generic
caP.Ital gams pref~rence over a five-year budget period,
whIch must be paId for under the OBRA 1990 operating
rules. In the 1989/1992 debate, the projected revenue
loss of the various generic cuts proposed by the Bush
administration ranged over five yea rs from about $12
billion to $24 billion using JCT figures. The proposed
small business capital gains cut would cost only $700
million and change over the five-year window. Secondly,
Pre~ident .Clinton campaigned hard against a generiC
capItal gaInS cu t and there a lready has been growing
party sol idarity on capital gains and rate increases
fr~m .1990 on, particularly in the House. This partisanshIp IS reflected 10 the recent administration victory in
the House on the budget resolution. For comparable
party solidarity in tax matters, you have to go back to
the first part of the Roosevelt Era, when FDR could
more or less obtain party solid ari ty until 1937, but
wasn't really serio us about federal income taxation
until this power had begun to fray. Pres ident Clinton
clearly does not have the same majority in the Senate

8SSee Hearings on the President's 1978 Tax Reduction and
Reform Proposals Before the HOl/ se Ways and Means Committ ee

(Part 5), 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2803 (1978) (Statement of Rep.
Ed Jenk~ns, D-Ga.); 135 Congo Rec. at H6295 (House Sept. 28.
1989 Dally Ed.) (Remarks of Rep . Dreir. R-Cal.) (semble). This
anecdotal evidence is somewhat confirmed by a recent survey.
"Family Business Prefer Lower Capital Gains Rate Over
Lower Estate and Gift Taxes, Says Coopers & Lybrand." 93
Tax Notes Today 82-87 (April 7, 1993); "Senior Execs Give
Priority to Deficit Reduction and Tax Incentives, " 93 Tax Not es
Today 49-59 (February 23. 1993) (in a February Ernst & Young
survey, smaller companies' executives ranked a capital gains
tax cut as "very important"); "Small-Business Owners Want
Capital Gains Cut, Arthur Andersen Survey Says," 92 Tax
Notes Today 239-60 (November 11, 1992).
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as in the House, but almost the same party solidarity.
This party solidarity more recently has more than
frayed at the edges.

Notwithstanding President Clinton1s
probable ability to obtain enactment of
a freestanding small-business capital
gains cut, I recommend steps to
thwart a future expansion to a
generic capital gains cut.
Notwithstanding President Clinton's probable
ability to obtain enactment of a freestanding smallbusiness capital gains cut, I recommend steps to thwart
a future expansion of this provision into a generic capital gains cut. In 1992, some Republicans talked of coming back another day to fashion a generic cut if a targeted small-business cut were enacted. Coupling with
a targeted small-business provision a progressive
generic cut, as the Senate and the Conference Committee did in 1992,86 just might attract enough Southern
Democrats, due to the benefits under a progressive rate
for recurring livestock sales by farmers as well as some
of the timber royalty taxpayers with low cash income,B7
if such benefits were so explained to the Southern
Democrats (and if the interests they champion are truly
the only ones they really want to champion). I would
advocate a progressive capital gains rate structure for
the reasons stated at I. B.4 . above. Indeed, it and the
annual $3,500 exclusion are the only capital gains
provisions I personally would support in the abstract
and, of course, in the alternative. To really split the
current conservative coalition and keep it split, couple
those measures wi th a small-business provision and a
capital gains preference for timber and livestock only.

86 1 don't regard the 1992 vote as a true "footnote" as Chairman Moynihan described it in Clymer, "Senate Tax Bill Wraps
Up a Bouquet of Tria l Balloons," New York Times, A-30, col. 1,
at col. 2 (March 15, 1992). Wasn't it much more of a campaign
statement for both parties, as Senators Packwood and Rudman then said? See 138 Congo Rec. S3264 (Senate March 11, 1992
Daily Ed.) (Remarks of Senator Packwood, Senate Finance
Committee member); accord. 138 Cong o Rec. S3181 (Senate
March 11,1992 Daily Ed.) (Remarks of Senator Packwood); cf.
id. at S3099 (Senate March 10, 1992 Daily Ed.) (Remarks of
Senator Ernest Hollings, D-S.C.); 138 Cong o Rec. 53363-64
(Senate March 12, 1992 Daily Ed.) (Remarks of Senator Warren
Rudman, R-N.H.).
871n the late 19505, only livestock and, to a lesser degree,
timber were heavily realized by then-middle-income
families. Hearings on the Revenue Act of 1963 Before the Senate
Finance Committee (Part 1), 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 197 (1963).
And such types of capital gains made up less than 9 percent
of all capital gains - mostly livestock rather than royalties.
In 1973 and 1977, timber gains amounted to .6 percent and
1.2 percent, and livestock amounted to .4 percent and .5 percent of all capital gains realizations, respectively (but no
distributional effects were provided). Treasury, Report to Congress on the Capital Gains Tax Reductions of 1978 (Sept. 1985).
Obviously, we need more recent data on this and many other
factual statements or assumptions in text and footnotes.
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E. Section 1244 Deductions
Some of the small business corporations invested in
by a pooled fund for high-income individuals might
qualify under section 1244 so that $100,000 in losses
will be ordinary. Since the cap on "smallness" here is
$1 million, section 1244(c)(3)(A), the overlap may not
be substantial. Nevertheless, the question arises as to
whether such a pooled fund partnership should be able
to pass through its section 1244 ordinary losses .
F. Sale of Mom-and-Pop Businesses
I understand from repeated conversations with Virginia tax practitioners at local tax conferences over the
past five years or so that the almost universal pattern
of sales of close ly held corporate businesses is an asset
sale by the target corporation (often on the installment
basis) followed by a liquidation of the target. While the
Bumpers bill spoke of a sale or exchange and a section
331 liquidation is treated as a sale at the shareholder
level, the legislative history should provide that the
active business test is applied immediately prior to the
sale where the liquidation timely occurs thereafter.
Congress might use the 1954 code section 337 12-month
test.

G. Passive and Tainted Business Exceptions
The legislative history shou ld spell out the rationales for the exclusion of service, financial, real estate,
farming, mineral extraction, and hospitality businesses
from the proposed targeted capital gains. At first blush,
the approach seems by-and-Iarge a ra tionalization or
perhaps mechanization of the old passive income tests
for personal holding companies. More likely, the com mon element is upfront preferences, primarily in the
form of accelera ted depreciation / amortization (rea I
estate, mineral extraction, hospitality and, perhaps,
farming), simplified accoun ting rules (small farms and
service businesses), or low effective rates in general
due to various preferences (financial institutions, particularly banks and insurance companies). Under the
la tter ra tiona Ie, a targeted capita l gains preference
upon disposition plus up-front preferences would constitute a "double hit" in the words of then-Senate
Finance Committee Chairman Bentsen (commenting
on the exclusion of depreciable assets from the Bush
administration's 1989 proposed capital gains
preference) .
H. Size of Preference Limitations
The 10:1 and $1 million gain restrictions, together
with the inclusion of half the small business preference
in the AMT base (for a 21-percent maximum gain), are
a ll necessary to prevent horizontal disparity from arising should pooled fund investments in small business
flourish. In other words, without these limitations, a
substantial number of high-income individuals might
be able to achieve effective rates in the high teens, far
below the proposed 28-percent AMT rate . This would
bring back part of the horizontal and vertica l inequities
of the 1954 code. These limitations shou ld be sticking
points for the administration. AMT is particularly vulnerable to a small-business carve-out, as demonstrated
by the House conservative coalition in 1978 and House
Republicans in 1992. But if the preference is not subject
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to the AMT, old vertical and horizontal disparities
would reappear if the pooled funds/outside capital
approach is successful.

v.

DEATHTIME TAXATION OF APPRECIATION

I believe (and judging from the literature, it is
probably the majority academic view) that ideal tax
rules would provide for annual accrual of public stock
gain and loss, preferably coupled with some sort of
passthrough integration of corporate and shareholder
taxes, ~n~ taxation at death of other unrealized capital
appreciation and perhaps carryover basis for closely
held businesses and farms with a step up if the
enteTJ~rise is continued by the family for five years.
IndexIng of the basis of capital and depreciable assets
and of debt completes the ideal package. History suggests, however, that enactment of these rules is not
politically feasible. Moreover, I fear that a serious
attempt to institute taxation at death of unrealized
capital appreciation would result at least in the conservative coalition broadening the capital gains
preference to a generic one. It appears that half of the
appreciation in public stock obtains a stepped up basis
at death . A taxation at death rule would probably raise
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revenue more by unblocking those sa les by older ta xpayers than by deemed sales at death. My further guess
IS that the conservative coalition could block a combination of both the proposed rate increases and taxation of capital gains at death . The likely result would
be generic capital gains linked with one or the other.
~h~ net result would probably be the same progresslvlty as at present, say 28 percent at the top . The
proposed rate increase with only a targeted capital gain
preference and a largely intact PAL should raise the
effective rate two or three points. Therefore, I would
not open that Pandora's box . But if I did , I would adapt
Senator Kennedy' S 1976 and 1981 proposa ls to carve
out small businesses and farms (with a $1 million or
so cap) to deflect the inevitable arguments that taxation
of unrealized capital appreciation at death would fall
heaviest on holders of public s tock . The best approach
here, and which I would favor beyond tongue-incheek, would be carryover basis for family owned
enterprises with step up to date of death value if a
member of the family materially participates in the
enterprise for a specified period after the decedent' s
death, much like the special farm use valuation
provisions of section 2032A.
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